

# **The Life Function: The Biopolitics of Sexuality and Race Revisited**

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## **Abstract**

This article argues that the relation between the biopolitical functions of life and death and the apparatuses of sexuality and race through which they operate is a contingent one. Foucault's *Society Must Be Defended* lectures and *Will to Knowledge* are revisited for genealogical clarity regarding the strategic relations underpinning their emergence, and to grasp how they differ tactically despite deploying similar discourses of abnormality and inclusion/exclusion. I suggest that sexuality can also act as an apparatus of death, as exemplified in the early twentieth century shift of heterosexuality, and more recently homosexuality, from the realm of death to life.

Key words: Michel Foucault, biopower, difference, apparatus, strategy, tactics, same-sex marriage, psychiatry

The specific pairing of race and death has been taken up recently by a number of Foucauldian thinkers.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, it seems more that instead of 'to make live and to let die,'<sup>2</sup> modern biopolitics is analysed increasingly in terms of how life can be made to die in order for it to live. In his *Society Must Be Defended* lectures, Foucault spoke of the 'death function'<sup>3</sup> as 'the murderous function of the State.'<sup>4</sup> The death function does not refer to crude killing nor to the death instinct in the Freudian psychoanalytical sense, but in a 'strictly historical sense'<sup>5</sup> to all forms of 'indirect murder,'<sup>6</sup> such as the exposure of someone to a greater risk of death, political death, expulsion, rejection, discrimination and so on. Foucault located the concentration of the death function in modern biopolitics as bound to the discourse of racism. While the newfound emphasis on race and death in Foucauldian scholarship is timely and

welcome, it often overlooks the relevance and relationship they have to the biopolitics of sexuality and life. The force of biopolitics is granted to the death function at the expense of life-producing mechanisms in three ways. First, it exaggerates the murderous effects of biopolitics as the primary active force that penetrates and administers life. Second, it reduces biopolitical difference production to death, and finally, it does so at the expense of downplaying the forceful endeavour to reproduce life. Sexuality, as Foucault argued, is not just a technology of truth of the self, but most importantly a discourse produced by biopower to ensure the procreation and optimization of the productive and reproductive capacities of the human species. The asymmetric interest in race and death over sexuality and life incites new questions about the place and operation of sexuality in the theorization of biopolitics. Race is a discourse<sup>7</sup> through which the human species is divided into groups and accordingly regulated, normalized and excluded.<sup>8</sup> If we assume outright that racism produces difference through inclusion/exclusion, sexual difference might even be considered theoretically reducible to racial difference. A more careful analysis of the genealogies of sexuality and race is necessary in order to understand the strategic and technological differences between race and sexuality.

This article presents a counterbalance to the current emphasis on race and the death function in which the function of sexuality, its centrality to modern biopolitics, and its inextricable relationship with race is often sidelined. It introduces the concept of the 'life function' as a way of mapping the biopolitical facilitation of the reproduction of population and thus life. I employ it to enable an analysis of the biopolitical strategy that strives to produce life, and how it becomes conducted through the deployment of the sexual apparatus. The article re-examines not only the genealogies of sexuality and race, but also the tactical and strategic facilitation and suppression of life in relation to these apparatuses. The result is a more nuanced understanding of not only how the racial production of difference varies from the sexual production of difference, but also of the contingent relation between the life and death functions of biopower and the apparatuses deployed to carry them out. We can witness, for example, how the death function can also operate through sexuality, and how the discourses of heterosexuality and homosexuality have been redelegated in the past from the realm of death to life.

Race and sexuality are both apparatuses deployed for the management of population by categorising, disciplining, and regulating its constituent subjects. The careful genealogies by

Ellen K. Feder<sup>9</sup> and Ladelle McWhorter,<sup>10</sup> for example, show how race and sexuality ‘are historically co-dependent and mutually determinative.’<sup>11</sup> Feder urges us to “‘think together” these categories [of race and gender] without conflating and thus misunderstanding the specific mechanisms of each.’<sup>12</sup> Feder is unable to answer her own question and grasp the functional differences of race and gender<sup>13</sup>. She is only able to show that the power deployed to enforce racial exclusion tends to emanate ‘primarily from the state’ which ‘works differently from the disciplinary power located within the family,’<sup>14</sup> but without specifying how.

McWhorter, in turn, scrutinizes the functional relations between biopower, race and sexuality. ‘Biopower,’ she writes, ‘would be impossible without [race and sexuality] ... They [too] could not function apart from it, nor could they function apart from each other.’<sup>15</sup> McWhorter theorizes the ‘fundamental issue’ pervading the modern biopolitical discourse of race as ‘abnormality.’<sup>16</sup> Modern racism targets abnormalities, understood as ‘racial impurities or threats to racial purity.’<sup>17</sup> Because sexual deviancy is an abnormality that hinders the perpetuation of racial purity, McWhorter argues that sexuality is also tied to race. Apart from its regulative relation to reproduction, it is unclear here exactly how sexuality tactically differs from race. While McWhorter’s magnification of the normalization process yields significant genealogical insights into the biopolitics of race in the US, race is not primarily about normalization, but the definition and management of the species whose life is to be protected and fostered. Normalization, the ‘crusade against deviance,’<sup>18</sup> is just one of the means by which this is done. This is a small point, but important, since the attainment of normality is not the central strategy behind sexuality and race: it does not link these discourses back to the question of the life of the species, hence it is also unable to fully explain how they execute such a biopolitical strategy.<sup>19</sup>

Following a re-examination of the *Society Must Be Defended* lectures and *Will to Knowledge*, this article considers the different tactics of difference production through a critical discussion of the biopolitical strategies by which sexuality and race are produced. In so doing, I examine how and why the death function is commonly territorialised on the apparatus of race, and how and for what purposes the life function is territorialised on sexuality. The article then examines the tactical intricacies of sexuality when it carries out the death function, for example, in the case of homophobia. I then demonstrate how discourses of sexuality alternately carry out the death and life functions. Heterosexuality, for instance, was

once designated to the realm of death, but is now imbued with the life function. Finally, I suggest homosexuality is being territorialised by the life function, for example through current debates of same-sex marriage. Through these examples, I argue that the functions of life and death are not exclusively tied to the apparatuses of sexuality and race, respectively, but rather these apparatuses are deployed in different historical moments and contexts to carry the administration of the life of the species, often involving radical reversals of discourse, strategy, and tactics.

### Race and Sexuality in *Society Must Be Defended*

Foucault's writings on race before the publication of his *Society Must Be Defended* lectures, as postcolonial thinkers have noted,<sup>20</sup> were limited to a few pages in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*. These two analyses of race, as Ann Laura Stoler's seminal analysis<sup>21</sup> explains, have significant differences. In the lectures, Foucault's analysis of racism is primarily linked to biopower and the emergence of nationalism, whereas in *The Will to Knowledge*, it is bound to sexuality and the bourgeois order. Racism therefore takes a central position in the lectures, only to be repositioned, according to Stoler, as an effect of the discipline of sexuality in his published work. For Stoler the shift of his analytical focus from race to sexuality entailed 'a clean erasure of the question of racism from his project.'<sup>22</sup> Although race certainly features less prominently in *Will to Knowledge*, but it is not erased or subordinated to sexuality in it. Rather, sexuality is identified as the critical hinge through which race was biopoliticised. Because in the lectures race and sexuality stood as separate apparatuses of biopower, *Will to Knowledge* provides a new thesis about the genealogical entanglement and interdependence between race and sexuality.

In his genealogy of racism in *Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault claims that race operated with an entirely different rationale prior to the emergence of biopolitics. Indeed, we are told that racism was not invented by the liberal regime of biopolitics, but operated long before it.<sup>23</sup> In the *Society Must Be Defended* lectures, race does not appear initially as a biologically-founded racist or repressive discourse, but as the discourse of a race struggle or race war spoken by those who lacked power. It manifested itself originally as a critique and attack of the unjust possession of power by another group.<sup>24</sup> Although the term was first articulated by the oppressed, it was later appropriated into other contexts and bestowed with new connotations, such as the biological meaning it acquired in the nineteenth century.

In giving a genealogy of racism, Foucault uncovers the rationalities of state racism in modern biopolitics. He contends that race became the discourse whereby the State was legitimized as the protector and administrator of the affairs of the race. When the State became the manager of the life of the race, state racism emerged as a new biological discourse of race, a change Foucault locates roughly in the mid-nineteenth century. At the moment of its entry into the biopolitical mechanisms of the State, the meanings and functions of racism as we know it flourished. Race was no longer a discourse of the oppressed concerned with emancipation, but one oriented to delineate and control the racial purity of a population. The preceding context of struggle as battle was replaced by an evolutionary theme of struggle, where the struggle was one of natural selection, for the survival of the species.<sup>25</sup>

Secondly, racism not only delineated national boundaries, but made divisions within the population that inhabited the State. Once the species could be categorized and hierarchized, for example, through understandings of biological degeneracy, the discourse of race struggle became 'a principle of exclusion and segregation and, ultimately, as a way of normalizing society,'<sup>26</sup> It was not just a means of determining national insiders and outsiders, but also a means of normalizing State populations by dividing them into normative racial groupings. Race did not exist only on the outside, but 'permanently, ceaselessly infiltrated the social body.'<sup>27</sup>

Finally, biopolitical race struggle provided the State with a justificatory framework for its murderous function.<sup>28</sup> 'Racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower,' Foucault writes, 'by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population.'<sup>29</sup> It is the entrance of racial discourse into the domain of biopolitics that gives rise to state racism and enables the state to kill not just those of other states, but its own citizens. Modern racism is therefore not only bound to the emergence of biopower,<sup>30</sup> but the biopolitical State. Its discourses of exclusion and oppression are the death function in practice against any person or group of people it identifies as a threat to the life of the species.

In the last lecture, Foucault recognizes the 'privileged position'<sup>31</sup> that sexuality assumed in the nineteenth century. Sexuality, he says, was a 'very different', although 'not altogether that different'<sup>32</sup> axis of biopolitics from race. He already notes the different forms, functions and

modes of their emergence in the biopolitical. 'The emergence of biopower,' according to Foucault is what 'inscribes [racism] in the mechanisms of the state.'<sup>33</sup> Sexuality on the other hand, 'was important for a whole host of reasons.'<sup>34</sup> First, sexuality is related to '*corporeal* mode[s] of *behaviour*.'<sup>35</sup> Second, it 'also has procreative effects' through the inscription of biological bodily processes. Finally, sexuality 'occupies a privileged position between organism and population, between the body and general phenomena' as it is where discipline (that acts on the body) and regulation (the biopolitics of population) intersect. In locating it at such an intense and critical intersection, his identification of sexuality as 'a vital field of strategic importance'<sup>36</sup> anticipates his *History of Sexuality* where sexuality is posited as a vital site of biopoliticization. Race and sexuality circulate as two separate strands of biopolitical intelligibility, where the former is divisive and deadly, while the latter is corporeal, behavioural and procreative.

### The Importance of Sexuality as a Point of Access

In *The Will to Knowledge*, Foucault modifies, expands, and fine-tunes his analysis of the relationship between sexuality and race. Crucially, Foucault observes that race is deployed by biopower in part by becoming entangled with the apparatus of sexuality. Sexuality is identified as a central regulating mechanism at the heart of the governance of life, which state racism converged with for support. It would appear, then, that the sexual apparatus also came into its own as a biopolitical apparatus through this discursive convergence.

Following his identification of sexuality as 'a field of vital strategic importance'<sup>37</sup> in the lectures, in *Will to Knowledge*, sexuality is said to be 'at the heart of this economic and political problem of population.'<sup>38</sup> Racism attains its biopolitical redefinition in conjunction with the genealogy of sexuality. Foucault's analytical conclusions regarding the operational place of race in his genealogy of biopolitics shifted from being central (as a force that gives rise to the biopolitical) to integral (one that became mobilized under the strategy of biopolitics). In the lectures it is 'the emergence of biopower that inscribes [race] in the mechanisms of the State,'<sup>39</sup> whereas in *Will to Knowledge* Foucault specifies that sexuality provided the 'anchorage points for the different varieties of racism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.'<sup>40</sup> In other words, in the lectures biopower is used to explain how racism became inscribed in the state as state racism, but exactly how this occurs, however, remains ambiguous.

By contrast, in *Will to Knowledge* we are treated to a genealogy of sexuality specifically as an apparatus deployed by biopolitics. It prioritizes the question of 'life' and 'its unfolding' as that over which 'power establishes its domain'<sup>41</sup> and in so doing centres the analysis around the technology of power that fundamentally underpins the politics of life, that is, that which facilitates its reproduction: sexuality. Sexuality was not just a discourse that became biopoliticized, but was created by and for biopower in order to administer power over life. Race was necessary to differentiate between species, to *determine* whose lives should be promoted or regulated, but it alone was not sufficient for, first, their thorough and systematic normalization and second, their reproduction. While the lectures explore the crucial problem of biopower through the delineation of populations according to species through the race discourse, *Will to Knowledge* presses further the question of how to make the species live by bringing it to life, keeping it alive, maintaining an appropriate rate of reproductive growth, and regulating it to live economically productive lives. The deployment of sexuality, Foucault argues, enabled biopower to access each of these aspects.

Foucault writes that modern biopolitics gives precedence to the maintenance and regulation of life over its purification and condemnation. This holds true in the case of both sexuality and race. The death function of race ultimately serves not killing and punishment, but the maintenance and administration of the life of the species. As Robert Bernasconi observes, 'when sex became a police matter, so did race, but not merely in the sense that both were regulated, but because ... it was through the controlling of sexuality that the potential of a race is maximized.'<sup>42</sup> Like sexuality, race was not a question of the mere 'irrevocable labelling of one part of the population,' but their main mode of control is in fact a 'constant examination of a field of regularity within which each individual is constantly assessed in order to determine whether he conforms to the rule, to the defined norm of health.'<sup>43</sup> Race is not just a new means of carrying out the death function of sovereign power, but it is a central part of determining whose lives to defend, preserve and regulate.

The lectures distinguish two series by which biopower operates in a normalizing society, 'the body-organism-discipline-institutions' series, and 'the population-biological processes-regulatory mechanisms-State'<sup>44</sup> series. In *Will to Knowledge*, these tactics of power over life are renamed: First is 'an anatomo-politics of the human body'<sup>45</sup> that seek to maximize and utilize its capabilities, and discipline and integrate the body into a system of economic

productivity. Second, regulatory controls, that is, the focus on the varying conditions that effect population through birth, death, health, life expectancy and longevity, are conceptualized as the ‘biopolitics of the population.’ This argument is familiar enough. How race came to operate along these trajectories is less so. Race is after all both a discourse inscribed on the body and enforces disciplinary control over it in the name of a defined biological population. Race, I would argue, was central to making this hinge politically meaningful by conceiving of population as a biological entity characterised by racial and special differences.

In the *Will to Knowledge*, Foucault writes that state racism took shape in the second half of the twentieth century – the same time as the sexual apparatus – and that ‘it was accompanied by a long series of permanent interventions at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life,’ and was driven by the need to ‘ensur[e] the triumph of the race.’<sup>46</sup> Sexuality is the point of access to both the population and the bodies that constitute it, but without race there would be no particular ‘living’ population to target its disciplinary and regulatory controls. The result of this convergence was the development of the eugenic ordering of society that bridged race and sexuality as two mutually-supporting apparatuses of modern biopower. The sexual apparatus therefore was properly mobilised through the discourse of state racism. In turn, the racial apparatus gained access to both bodies and population through the sexual apparatus, giving rise to the birth of modern eugenic thought.

### Strategies and Tactics of Sexuality and Race

How, then, does biopower, through what different strategies and tactics, act on the body to racialize or sexualize it? Foucault’s answers to these questions are helpful, but partial. His analysis of race is unfinished, and his elucidation of the different forces that sexualize and racialize the body is never sufficiently articulated. They can be developed, I suggest, by further engagement with his concepts of strategies and tactics.

In what he calls a ‘strategic model’ (instead of a juridical one) of questioning discourses, he calls tactics the ‘reciprocal effects [of discourses that] power and knowledge ensure,’ and strategy the ‘conjunction and ... force relationship [that] make[s] their utilization necessary.’<sup>47</sup> Foucault employs this strategic model to distinguish his means of critical interrogation from one that privileges a theory of sovereignty that ‘presupposes the subject ...



establish[es] the essential unity of power, and ... is always deployed within the pre-existing element of the law.'<sup>48</sup> Therefore, rather than starting from pre-existing subjects and elements, analysis begins from the power relationship itself, 'showing how actual relations of subjugation manufacture subjects,'<sup>49</sup> In other words, a strategic analysis exposes the objectives of power and how it produces subjects. The second task should be to interrogate the tactics of biopower to 'reveal relations of domination,' or, the effects of the actualization of discourse. In what follows I consider more closely these tactics and strategies of difference in sexuality and race, or, what operations of power produce sexuality and race, and with what effects regarding the relations they produce.

Foucault argued that the overall objective of modern sexuality was 'motivated by one basic concern: to ensure population, to reproduce labour capacity, to perpetuate the form of social relations.'<sup>50</sup> Sexuality is therefore concerned with the regulation of both the reproductive and productive potential of population. The emergence of capitalism was one of the discourses and practices that emerged, not outside or against the biopolitical *raison d'État*, but within it, with the objective of the state's enrichment.<sup>51</sup> The growth of human population was correlated to the growth of productive forces and financial profit.<sup>52</sup> Sexuality was introduced as 'the index of a society's strength, revealing of both its political energy and its biological vigor,'<sup>53</sup> thereby making it necessary to control the forms and uses of individual sexual behaviour in order to make use of it.

How does biopolitics, then, make use of sexuality to 'make society into a machine of production'?<sup>54</sup> Moreover, how is Foucault able to claim that the procreative function of sexuality turned out to be 'the source of an entire capital for the species to draw from'?<sup>55</sup> Biopower, according to Foucault, bestowed 'a regulative role to the one type of sexuality that was capable of reproducing labour power and the form of the family.'<sup>56</sup> In order to make bodies reproductive it was necessary to discipline them, and sexuality 'was a means of access to both the life of the body and the life of the species.'<sup>57</sup> It enabled the control of both the body and the population as a whole, relying on a whole host of mechanisms (for example, medical, biological, pedagogical, demographic, and psychiatric) for the 'state management of marriages, births, and life expectancies.'<sup>58</sup> <sup>59</sup> In other words, sexuality was recognized as a means to control the reproduction of the fleshy, material object of biopolitics, the species-body. To grasp and maximize control over this function, sexuality was deployed through the motif of the Malthusian couple, the socialization of procreative behaviour, as well as the

hysterisization of women's bodies and the pedagogization of children's sex.<sup>60</sup> Sexuality thus was not just a means of inserting the human body into the capitalist machine and ensuring labour capacity. It ensured the maintenance of population numbers, particular bodily behaviours and re/productive capacities.

At first, this genealogy of sexuality may appear to suggest that the biopolitical strategy of sexuality is the opposite to that of race. Race becomes a deadly weapon of biopower by justifying the State's right to kill racial others. Sexuality, on the other hand, enables the reproduction of life by managing sexually reproductive behaviour. In broad terms, race provides biopower with the death-function, while sexuality mainly performs a 'life-function'. Yet, although race and sexuality function along different tactical trajectories, they are not oppositional or incompatible, but necessarily complementary. As Foucault pointed out, the biopolitical discourse of life and its positive mission to propagate and care for life has thrived in the modern era that is at the same time one of the most murderous periods of history. Mass-slaughter is instigated by States on behalf of life and prosperity. The critical intersection of race and sexuality avails itself in this contradiction when the State kills on behalf of the life of the species so that the sexuality of its population can continue to operate. Race delineates the operational terrain of sexuality by separating those who should reproduce from those who should not. For there is no species without race, and the species cannot survive without its reproduction.

Although they do not articulate their findings in these terms, several studies demonstrate the intricate relationship between the death function in race and the life function in sexuality. Anna Marie Smith, for example, analyses British immigration legislation that placed more restrictions on British women than British men who brought foreign spouses into the UK.<sup>61</sup> The 1914 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act ruled that only women who married British men were eligible for British nationality. The law was underpinned by a fear that presumably non-white male immigrants would become sexually involved with assumedly white British women if they were forbidden to bring their wives and children into the country. In the eyes of the British government, non-white female immigrants lacked the hypersexual predation of the black male<sup>62</sup> seen as a threat to the racial purity of the home-grown white population. The Act's death function therefore worked to protect the racial purity of the British nation, the racial classification and control of undesirable sexually

reproductive subjects, in order to determine the desirable reproductive subjects to be targeted by the life function.

Undesirable candidates for the sexual reproduction of the species are also to be found within the 'home' population. As mentioned, Foucault's broad understanding of race encompasses not only skin colour, but a range of differences through which the population can be classified. The eugenic programmes of US and European welfare states introduced from the 1920s onwards, for example, targeted particular groups in its own population for sterilization. While the atrocities of Nazi eugenic policy brought an end to many such programmes, the sterilization of criminals, the poor, the 'feeble-minded', the mentally ill, mentally retarded and disabled persisted, albeit with decreasing popularity, into the 1970s in several Scandinavian countries.<sup>63</sup> The death function here created not only biological others, but also medical, psychiatric and socio-economic deviants that, should they reproduce would damage the superior quality and impede the progress of the life of the species. Weeded of the unsuitable and defective members of the community, the life function would be deployed on those deemed biologically, medically, psychologically, and socio-economically fit.

This does not mean that those deemed racially other are not in some way useful to the biopolitical objective of maintaining the life of the species other than by preserving racial purity through their absence. The exclusionary practices of the racial death function can also have a productive effect. As Foucault wrote in *Will to Knowledge* of the governance of the abnormal, 'if it was truly necessary to make room for illegitimate sexualities, it was reasoned, let them take their infernal mischief elsewhere ... if not in the circuits of production, at least in those of profit.'<sup>64</sup> Such practices of biopower are prevalent in the labour politics of immigrants across Western societies. In the United States, a racially segmented labour force directs Mexican and other Latin American immigrants into precarious or hazardous jobs in farms, meat packing, and construction, with minimal wages and little or no health or retirement benefits. As Paul Apostolidis writes, they 'occupy these dangerous and ill-compensated jobs ... precisely *so that* the racially privileged population can thrive.'<sup>65</sup> Likewise in Europe, what is known by feminists as 'global care chains' are also realized through such workings of the death and life functions. Elin Peterson's<sup>66</sup> study of domestic workers in Spain shows how women's so-called reconciliation of work and family life that is supposed to play a significant part in realizing gender equality, is in fact enabled by female immigrant workers who take on the domestic and care work of Spanish middle-class women.

Hence, the ability of Spanish women to reproduce the species and produce the nation's wealth (i.e., 'reconcile' work and family life) is made possible by the racial delineation of immigrant women not as reproducers, but as lower-class labouring others.

As these cases show, neither the life function nor the death function is of any use in the biopolitical control of population without the other. The death-function of race operates *so that* sexuality may perform the life-function, working together to affirm the life of the species. Biopolitics therefore harnesses the death function of racism as an inextricable part of the strategy of the reproduction and regulation of the life of the species.

### Sexuality and Death

So far I have focused on the operation of the death function through race as a means of dividing the population into insiders and outsiders, into those whose reproduction should be encouraged and those whose should be minimized or avoided. The death function, however, is not executed exclusively through race. It is also unfolds through sexuality. The relation between functions and the apparatuses through which they are realized is, I argue, a contingent one. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's concept of re/deterritorialization is useful to understand this relation. Deterritorialization and reterritorialization are interlinked processes, the former involving something being left behind or breaking apart, and the latter involving the recombination of elements leading to the emergence of new assemblages and relations, such as new apparatuses.<sup>67</sup> The biopolitical production of race, for example, is an effect of the reterritorialization of the death function on specific pieces of biological, psychological and sociological knowledge categorising the human species into various groups and sub-groups. Likewise the biopolitical production of sexuality is an effect of the reterritorialization of the life function, premised upon for example linkages forged between biological knowledge of reproductive organs and the psychiatrization of pleasure. In this section I employ the concept of re/deterritorialization to argue that the death function is not exclusive to race. The death function can become reterritorialized, in other words, its elements and relations can be recombined and recaptured anew, around and through sexuality.

Homophobia is perhaps the most obvious example of the death function operating through sexuality. The deadly and exclusionary mechanisms enacted through sexuality are

strategically distinct from the death function of race. In this case, the death function of sexuality disciplines the corporeal *behaviour* of the sexed and sexual subject, in other words, attempts to subject it to the life function by urging, persuading or coercing it to sexually reproduce at the threat of death. The territorialization of sexuality by the death function re-enforces the discipline of the category of sexuality established by the life function. In other words, death reterritorializes sexuality as the ultimate punishment for a sexuality that will not discipline and normalize itself to perform this function.

The infamous murder of Matthew Shepard is a case in point. On the evening of the 6<sup>th</sup> of October, 1998, twenty-one year old homosexual US university student Matthew Shepard was kidnapped by two other twenty-one year old young men in Colorado. Shepard was brutally beaten with a pistol, resulting in severe bruising and crushing parts of his skull, then stripped naked and tied to a fence and abandoned. He was discovered the next afternoon, taken to hospital, and died a few days later on the 12<sup>th</sup> of October. While the case has been covered by several feminist and queer theorists in relation to gender violence,<sup>68</sup> it can also be considered as an example of how the death function is reterritorialized through the motif of sexuality. Shepard's intolerable homosexuality became punishable by death. Death, in this instance, was brought to bear on his person as the final form of discipline for sexuality that did not behave itself. The Shepard case therefore suggests that for life to be allowed to die does not necessarily require the death function of race as such. Whereas racism is essentially exclusion on the basis of biological and species difference, in this case homophobia excludes according to the perceived misbehaviour of a sexed body and its aberrant sexual desire in relation to other sexed bodies. Homophobia 'is an oppression based on the *activities* of the members of a group, and not any definite group attributes'<sup>69</sup> like racism most often is. The death function reterritorializes sexuality when the perceived sexual misbehaviour becomes not only intolerable but threatening, and those practicing it must be left to suffer, die or be killed.

The death function operates at its most intense through race, but nothing dictates that it should be exclusive to it. For Foucault and other Foucauldian thinkers,<sup>70</sup> the Nazi camp is the epitome of 'an absolutely racist State, an absolutely murderous State, and an absolutely suicidal State.'<sup>71</sup> The enmeshment of the murderous State with the apparatus of race, however, is complicated by the fact that those bearing the pink triangle were not dispatched to the camps because they were not of the Aryan race (though some of them surely were both homosexuals and non-Aryans), but because their sexual deviancy was seen as a threat to the

reproductivity of the Aryan race. Homosexuals were not killed because they were racially different, but because their sexual *behaviour* threatened the reproductive capacities of the Aryan race. This distinction is essential, for it argues that when the death function territorializes sexuality, it does so through an entirely different tactical trajectory than race, through a different field of de/reterritorialization.

Foucault tells us that sexuality is bound to the production of life, not death, which may explain why so few feminists have taken up the problem of biopolitical death in relation to sexuality/sex. One exception is Judith Butler, who has argued that in the 1980s AIDS crisis we can witness how “sex” is constructed not only in the service of life or reproduction but ... in the service of the regulation and apportionment of death.’<sup>72</sup> According to Butler,<sup>73</sup> Foucault was so preoccupied with disentangling the psychoanalytic association of sex with death that he overlooked how sex not only secures life but produces and proliferates death. Nonetheless, she acknowledges that Foucault was aware that “sex is worth dying for”... that preserving the regime of “sex” is worth dying for and that political wars are waged so that populations and their reproduction can be secured.’<sup>74</sup> Foucault made clear that sexuality is not just exclusively a question of reproduction and vitality, but because it is also a fundamentally medicalized discourse, it operates on the basis of normalization to the extent of rendering monstrous those that it consigns to the abnormal.<sup>75</sup>

In turn Susan Sontag argues that in the 1980s US public discourse, AIDS was seen as ‘a punishment for deviant sex,’<sup>76</sup> which is why many felt that those infected could be ‘deservedly’ left to die. The homosexual subjects of 1980s AIDS discourse were produced and condemned not only by the sexual apparatus, but also a racial one. It was not just a case of reprimanding or allowing punishment to fall on sexual deviants, but also disciplining a racial and eugenic threat. Its carriers were ostracized for allegedly participating in sexual (mis)conduct that spread an infectious disease that was detrimental to the health and potency of Western populations.<sup>77</sup> Moreover, in the West, the African origin of the HIV virus played a significant role in framing AIDS a major racial threat; it is consistently portrayed as ‘a disease that comes from foreigners, from outsiders, and especially from “black” Africans.’<sup>78</sup> The death functions of race and sexuality were deployed to safeguard the life function of Western populations, which needed to be protected from a debilitating disease from a racially inferior African continent. The effort to defend the population from the corrupting malady is exemplified by immigration policies of the US and China, in force until 2010, that restricted

the mobility of persons diagnosed with HIV/AIDS, barring them from entering the country for example by refusing to issue visas to HIV positive applicants.<sup>79</sup>

In this section I have shown that the death function is not exclusive to race, but that it can also territorialize sexuality. Whereas race becomes reterritorialized by the death function as a means of establishing the parameters of the species, of those who should be allowed to live and encouraged to reproduce, and who should not, the death function reterritorializes sexuality when a perceived sexual misbehaviour becomes intolerable or threatening, and those practicing it must be left to die or be killed in order to protect the propagation and well-being of the species. In the human species, therefore, the death function operates through both race and sexuality, whereas the life function is only territorialized on sexuality, and specifically heterosexuality. However, with careful analysis, even the life function's straightforward territorialization of heterosexuality cannot be taken for granted.

#### Reterritorializing the Life Function

Having explored the relationship between race and sexuality, and between the life and death functions, this section returns to the concept of the life function introduced in this article. I have conceptualized the life function as the endeavour to reproduce life, and thus, the reproduction of the object of biopolitics. At present, heterosexuality dominates as the discourse through which the life function is most rigorously deployed. It cannot, however, be taken for granted as a dominant discourse. It often goes unnoticed that upon the emergence of the discourse of sexuality described by Foucault in *Will to Knowledge*, heterosexuality had not yet been problematized. The Victorians were preoccupied with the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the Malthusian couple and the perverse adult.<sup>80</sup> Indeed, it is the conjugal Malthusian couple that Foucault describes in relation to different-sex sexual relations, not heterosexuality as such. Contrary to what we might assume, Jonathan Ned Katz's *The Invention of Heterosexuality* aptly demonstrates that heterosexuality did not properly enter the realm of the normal until the early twentieth century. This detail is highly significant, as it reveals that the life function is neither innately nor solely tied to heterosexuality. This leaves the door open to consider how the life function can and continues to reterritorialize other sexualities at present.

In his book, Katz provides a provocative genealogy of heterosexuality claiming against conventional understandings that ‘heterosexuality is not identical to the reproductive intercourse of the sexes’ nor is it ‘the same as sex distinctions and gender differences,’ or even ‘the eroticism of women and men.’ Rather, it is ‘one particular historical arrangement of the sexes and their pleasures.’<sup>81</sup> Katz’s argument is highly significant for Foucauldian scholars, for *Will to Knowledge* is often read as a history of the emergence of homosexuality,<sup>82</sup> leaving us in the dark about the place and politics of heterosexuality in the genealogy.

Katz’s work fills this gap. He does not contradict Foucault’s grounding of the deployment of sexuality in the Victorian era, but rather takes the genealogy of sexuality further. Firstly, it is essential to note that in *Will to Knowledge* Foucault did not analyze a discourse of heterosexuality, but rather identified the ‘Malthusian couple’<sup>83</sup> in the ‘conjugal family’<sup>84</sup> as the figure problematized to realize ‘legitimate and procreative’ reproduction.<sup>85</sup> Katz’s genealogy serves as a warning not to conflate this with heterosexuality, for the Malthusian couple of the conjugal family is merely one form of different-sex sexual relations, and it is not the same as heterosexuality. Heterosexuality was not initially territorialized by the life function. As Katz writes, ‘the new term *heterosexual* did not, at first, always signify the normal and good.’<sup>86</sup> In fact, in the late Victorian period the term was first employed by psychiatrists who equated it with perversion because it deviated from the norm of sex as the dominion of true love that could only be fulfilled after marriage. In 1892, Dr. James G. Kiernan of Chicago for example wrote in an article on ‘Sexual Perversion’ that heterosexuality was one of the “‘abnormal manifestations of the sexual appetite.’”<sup>87</sup> Such definitions circulated until the 1920s, when an edition of Webster’s dictionary still defined heterosexuality as a “‘morbid sexual passion for one of the opposite sex.’”<sup>88</sup> Well into the early twentieth century, therefore, heterosexuality was an aberration that referred to an unproductive different-sex pleasure that separated lust from love.

On the basis of Katz’s genealogy, the normality of different-sex erotic relations cannot be taken for granted. The heterosexual is not a clear-cut subject with a coherent history, but rather has been shaped by a complex process of de/reterritorializations around different-sex sexuality. Heterosexuality was gradually normalized from the turn of the century onwards, at first by individual psychiatrists claiming that the sexual instinct of heterosexuality was biological and therefore natural. Later they co-opted the term ‘to affirm the superiority of



different-sex eroticism.’<sup>89</sup> Katz explains the change in terms of the increasingly common private practices of erotic pleasure amongst the late nineteenth-century middle classes that contradicted the norm of conjugal sex. By then, the middle classes had established their social position and importance. Indeed, in *Will to Knowledge* Foucault emphasizes the importance of the bourgeoisie as the locus of the new apparatus of sexuality where ‘the most rigorous techniques were formed.’<sup>90</sup> In this light, their non-conformity to the discourse through which the life function operated, of true love between the conjugal Malthusian couple, was problematic and the expanding prevalence of ‘deviant’ heterosexual behaviour began to menace the dominance of the figure of the Malthusian couple through which the life function operated. Consequently, the threat posed by different-sex pleasure was defused through the re-invention of heterosexuality as a discourse that ‘publicly named, scientifically normalized, and ethically justified the middle-class practice of different-sex pleasure.’<sup>91</sup>

But how exactly did non-reproductive pleasure-seeking different-sex eroticism become reterritorialized by the life function? After all, it does not aim to reproduce, nor does it guarantee it (although it can result in offspring). Katz proceeds to examine Freudian psychoanalysis as a new field of knowledge that both supported and challenged heterosexuality. I want to take this further by arguing that Freudian psychoanalysis provided not only the modern psychological model of heterosexuality as Katz demonstrates, but also paradoxically, through its challenge to the reproductive norm, provided biopower with new tactics for re-ordering the apparatus of sexuality. This is a crucial knot to untie also for understanding the normalization of homosexuality and its reterritorialization by the life function at present.

Indeed, Katz sees Freud’s legacy as somewhat contradictory, in that ‘his theories provide the most complex support of heterosexual rule *and* important tools for challenging heterosexual dominion.’<sup>92</sup> On the one hand, Freud problematized homosexuality as a developmental aberration and assumed heterosexuality as the successful result of early development. On the other hand, Freud de-naturalized heterosexuality by rendering it a social product of the development process. Read biopolitically, however, the extent to which this de-naturalization challenges heterosexuality is curtailed by understanding the challenge to different-sex naturalness itself as a reconfiguration and expansion of the reach of biopower and thus, the re-operationalization of the life function. As Foucault forebodes, that sexual behaviour in Western societies was able to change without the realization of political transformation ‘is

sufficient proof that this whole sexual ‘revolution,’ this whole ‘anti-repressive’ struggle, represented nothing more, but nothing less ... than a tactical shift and reversal in the great deployment of sexuality.’<sup>93</sup> Making heterosexuality psychiatrically and socially acceptable signified not a dismantling of the sexual apparatus but an expansion of its terrain through a shift in its configuration.

Freud’s work accomplished the legitimation of the previously ‘morbid’ heterosexuality through at least two significant shifts in the understanding of sexuality; first, by adding pleasure to the elements that are seen to constitute life, and second, by laying new importance to the social, non-reproductive aspects that ensure the reproduction of different-sex sexual relations. Freud radically rearranged the sexual order of things to argue that pleasure, ‘the attainment of organ-pleasure,’<sup>94</sup> not reproduction, is the main driver of the sexual instincts. In this new schema, reproduction is subordinated to the pleasure principle, but not entirely replaced and certainly not erased by it. Pleasure became the main goal of the sexual instinct, and fertility was rendered ‘a late, secondary development in life’s long pursuit of happiness.’<sup>95</sup> In Freud, we could say, pleasure is linked to life *through* a shift in the sexual order of things away from the crude reproductive principle to a more complex apparatus.

Freud toppled the dominance of reproductive increase, but in so doing he rendered pleasure essential for reproduction, for given the primacy of pleasure, there could no longer be sexual reproduction without the primary initiating drive for pleasure. For Freud, the aim of each of the sexual instincts, which ‘emanate from a great variety of organic sources’<sup>96</sup> is to aim for the ‘attainment of organ-pleasure’ upon which ‘do they enter the service of the reproductive function and thereupon become generally recognized as sexual instincts.’<sup>97</sup> Pleasure is therefore not a guarantee for reproduction, but reproduction arises from the pleasure-seeking instinct of the individual. A sexual instinct is defined by the eventual entering of an instinct into the service of the reproductive function. An instinct can be labelled as perverse when the acts move completely away from reproduction and exclusively carry out a given deviation.<sup>98</sup> A normal sexual instinct for Freud can therefore accommodate a whole host of practices before it becomes deviant, and this deviancy is ultimately defined by its removal from the reproductive. The introduction of the pleasure principle therefore expanded the kinds of relations that could be infused with biopower as potential vessels of the life function. Different-sex pleasure-seeking eroticism therefore went from being corruptive of the life

function to conductive of it. By linking pleasure to life the previously sexually deviant heterosexuality became a potentially biopolitically useful category.

Guy Hocquenghem surmises that ‘Freud discover[ed] the libido to be the basis of affective life and immediately enchain[ed] it as the Oedipal privatization of the family’<sup>99</sup>. The linking of pleasure to life occurred hand in hand with the emergence of the Oedipal thesis. The second tactical shift apparent in Freud’s work is the socialization of heterosexuality through the Oedipal process, which purports that a boy child becomes heterosexually socialized by wanting to sexually possess his mother and kill his father (conversely a girl sexually desires her father as a consequence to the experience of penis envy). As Katz argues, there is a subversive aspect to this theory in that it argues that ‘heterosexuals are made not born.’<sup>100</sup> Yet, at the same time, the notion of the Oedipus complex renders the successful attainment of heterosexuality a biopolitical challenge. The emergence of the Oedipal scenario meant that different-sex sexual attraction could no longer be taken for granted. Rather, it had to be ensured through the appropriate upbringing of the child. Thus, the sexuality of both the child and parent were problematized, reorienting and expanding the reach of biopower to a new set of relations and relationships through which the life function could operate.

The notion that the child must desire the parent of the opposite sex also relates back to how pleasure became bound to sex and life. The child must learn to desire ‘correctly’ by yearning for the parent of the opposite sex, and the parent’s response to the child’s interest would determine the child’s future orientation for pleasure-satisfying objects and sexes. Pleasure, in this sense, was essential for educating the sexual instincts in such a way that they would eventually lead to reproduction.

The challenge posed to the Malthusian conjugal couple by heterosexuality therefore resulted not in the liberation of sexuality, but the reterritorialization of the life function on heterosexuality. It did not replace the Malthusian couple, but rather expanded the range of different-sex sexualities territorialized by the life function. This is unsurprising; the discourse of heterosexuality ‘always unfolded within the deployment of sexuality, and not outside or against it.’<sup>101</sup> Heterosexuality, originally ascribed to death, re-emerged as a vehicle for the reproduction of life. Since the 1970s, however, heterosexuality too has been challenged. The rise of divorce rates, the articulation of new family forms, and the feminist and gay liberation movements have all been perceived as destabilising forces for the conjugal and/or

heterosexual apparatus. According to Katz, 'the commodification of pleasure further breaks down old distinctions between hetero and homo' by marketing pleasure-sex to both sexualities, whereby 'heterosexuals are more and more like homosexuals, except for the sex of their sexual partners.'<sup>102</sup> Other authors have commented on the selectivity of the normalization of homosexuality. Smith, for example, demonstrates how in the 1980s in Britain the acceptable homosexual was a 'law-abiding, disease-free, self-closeting homosexual figure who knew her or his proper place on the secret fringes of mainstream society.'<sup>103</sup> Positive-image campaigns promoted an image of non-threatening 'white, middle-class professional gay men in monogamous relationships who demonstrate impeccable bourgeois taste.'<sup>104</sup> This normalisation, I argue below, also entails a recent reterritorialisation of homosexuality by the life function.

### The Re-Oedipalization of Homosexuality

If a renewed biopoliticization of homosexuality is not be immediately apparent from the marketing techniques mentioned above, it becomes so after a glance at recent Western scientific and political debates on monogamous same-sex relationships. Notably, the struggle for the political recognition of gay relationships through the institution of marriage is often paired with a debate about same-sex parenting. In the Netherlands in 2001 and in Norway and Sweden in 2009, adoption rights were also passed at the same time as gender-neutral marriage laws replaced registered partnerships previously available to same-sex couples. In Spain in 2005, adoption rights were passed with the same stroke as same-sex marriage was legalized. Marriage continues to be so bound to the norms of family and parenthood, that to approve of same-sex marriage seems to be equated with the approval of same-sex parenting. Indeed, it is in this latter point that prominent voices from the scientific community concentrate their efforts.

Psychiatric research in particular is used by both proponent and opponents of same-sex marriage to argue that same-sex parenting either does not or does harm the sexual development of children.<sup>105</sup> When US Professor Law Lynn D. Wardle initiated a debate on homosexual parenting in 1997 in the *University of Illinois Law Review*, he argued that different-sex parents are necessary for the balanced psychological development of a child. Fatherlessness, for example, can lead to friendlessness, poorer educational standards and discipline, crime, emotional insecurity, and unhappy and unsuccessful future relationships.<sup>106</sup>

Wardle's article leaned on the usual argument against same-sex parenting that claimed that homosexuals are unable to raise heterosexual children.<sup>107</sup> He drew directly from psychoanalytic thinkers like Erik Erikson and Bronislaw Malinowski, thus perpetuating necessity of the Freudian Oedipal scenario for the correct development of children's sexuality. For them, homosexuality threatens the Oedipal process (and thus the reproduction of the species). Not only does it not reproduce society, but also it does not reproduce the Oedipus complex necessary for its reproduction, which is ensured through the heterosexual family.<sup>108</sup>

Defenders of homosexual marriage and parenting, by contrast, counter-argue that 'lesbian and gay parents do not produce inferior or even particularly different kinds of children than do other parents.'<sup>109</sup> They do not question the overall validity of the Oedipal discourse that addresses the relationship between child and parent, but rather argue within the finer points of the apparatus of sexuality. In so doing they too engender the reproblematicization of homosexuality that also amounts to a re-oedipalization of homosexuality<sup>110</sup> through new tactical shifts that modify the Freudian Oedipal thesis to accommodate gay parenting within the sphere of normality. A number of scholars since the 1980s<sup>111</sup> like William Meezan and Jonathan Rauch refute the traditional Freudian reading according to which 'children of lesbian and gay parents are confused about their gender identity ... or that they are more likely to be homosexual,'<sup>112</sup> Instead, they suggest that children might actually 'benefit from the marriage of their lesbian and gay parents.'<sup>113</sup> First, they write, 'marriage increases the economic capital available to children;' second, the 'durability and stability of the parental relationship ... is of vital importance to children;'<sup>114</sup> and third, 'same-sex marriage might benefit children through social investment' by providing them with 'social resources,' 'legal and regulatory protections' and intangible benefits like 'social prestige and unquestioned parental authority' as well as 'stronger community support.'<sup>115</sup> Their argument in favour of same-sex marriage relies on evidence that same-sex parents are able to reproduce the symbolic familial order of nuclear different-sex families seen as necessary for a child's 'normal' development.

Meezan and Rauch's ambivalent approach to the Oedipal process is symptomatic of the current re-problematicization of homosexuality. On the one hand, they deny that the non-heterosexuality of parents confuses the sexual development of children, a position that neither clearly denies nor affirms the standard Oedipal model. It does not deny the importance of the

basic premise of the thesis; the adult-child relationship. It only disagrees on the alleged outcomes of the conflict between them by suggesting that same-sex parents can produce different-sex sexually desiring children. Moreover, by highlighting the beneficial aspects of defending 'normality' especially with regards to social reproduction (capital, mental stability, production) among families with same-sex parents, parties supporting same-sex marriage have asked the same biopolitical question as those opposing it: what forms of marriage and parenting ensure a happy, normal, socially beneficial and stable life in our society? What constitutes a happy, normal, socially beneficial and stable life is, of course, already pre-determined by different-sex sexuality norms. It is no wonder then that Meezan and Rauch argue that married same-sex couples can and are likely to reproduce the social and economic relations of the legitimized heterosexual majority. From this perspective, homosexuality can reproduce the Oedipus complex, not by being the outside against which heterosexual normalcy is maintained, but by reorienting the Oedipus complex to include a certain kind of homosexuality – a non-threatening one that looks, lives, behaves, consumes, and produces like heterosexuality.

Thus, it is possible to argue that a reterritorialization of homosexuality by the life function through re-oedipalization of homosexuality is underway. But, this oedipalization is not Freudian. Psychoanalytic theory has undergone great change since Freud. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to address the subject properly, we could take Lacan as a case in point to exemplify the move of psychoanalysis away from biology. Lacan notably separated desire from anatomy, emphasising language over biology as the mode by which sexual desire is produced. This turn is apparent in the reproblematicization of homosexuality, especially amongst certain scientists and advocates of same-sex marriage. If sexuality is an effect of language rather than nature, then there is nothing biologically innate about different-sex parents and the production of heterosexual children whereby it is possible to argue that same-sex parents too can rear heterosexual children. The reproblematicization of homosexuality has led to the emergence of the idea that same-sex couples can reproduce the heterosexual symbolic order and hence are not threatening to the life of the population, and therefore should not be ascribed to the realm of death. Rather, according to this new rationality, homosexuality might even serve to reproduce both the symbolic order and hence, eventually, life.

## Conclusion

This article has sought to make certain conceptual observations, arguments and specifications regarding the strategic and tactical workings of the life and death function with regards to the apparatuses of sexuality and race. It responds to the recent emphasis on the death function of race in Foucauldian studies in order to clarify the different strategies and tactics by which life and death are operationalized through the production of difference. To speak of a life function is not to speak of an opposite to the death function. Race and sexuality both partition and categorize the species, but the latter usually according to a biological categorization of subjectivities to determine who should reproduce and who should not, and the former according to the reproductive principle on those whose lives should be promoted. The idea of a 'function' is crucial here. It is a concept that allows us to critically scrutinize the complex strategies and tactics of biopolitics and how they shift in their promotion of life and inscription of death across time and place.

The life and death functions are not historically bound and stable, neither are they fastened exclusively to the discourses of race or sexuality. They do not emanate from race and sexuality, but rather race and sexuality are strategically and tactically territorialized and reproduced by biopower in order to enact the functions of life and death. Over the last century, the strategies of biopower have shifted numerous times and in complex ways, reversing, shifting and expanding its tactics to reproduce life. The life function, premised on the assumption of the necessity of sexual difference for the sexual reproduction of human life, has also undergone major tactical shifts since the Victorian period analysed by Foucault. Since then, sexualities once produced by the death function, such as heterosexuality and homosexuality, have been reproblematised and reterritorialized by the life function. At the crux of both tactical reversals are major changes in the sexual behaviour of Western societies; in the former it was the increase of non-reproductive different-sex sex, in the latter, the articulation of gay liberation and emergence of new family forms. It is nothing new to regard the normalization of homosexuality as problematic, but understanding it through the life function concept adds a new dimension to understanding not only to how it has emerged, but also what this phenomenon is in the first place. For in question is not merely the normalization of homosexuality, but its biopoliticization as a positive (rather than a negative) apparatus of sexuality. From this perspective, the genealogical analysis of the biopolitical 'monarchy of sex'<sup>116</sup> is therefore far from over.

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## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).; Jeremy W. Crampton, "Maps, Race and Foucault: Eugenics and Territorialisation Following World War I," in *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*, eds. Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 223-244.; Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, *The Liberal Way of War: Killing to make Life Live* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).; Mark Duffield, "Racism, Migration and Development: The Foundations of Planetary Order," *Progress in Development Studies* 6, no. 1 (January 01, 2006): 68-79.; Stuart Elden, "The War of Races and the Constitution of the State: Foucault's 'Il Faut Défendre La Société' and the Politics of Calculation," *Boundary 2* 29, no. 1 (March 1, 2002): 125-151.; Roberto Esposito, *Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).; Vivienne Jabri, "Michel Foucault's Analytics of War: The Social, the International, and the Racial," *International Political Sociology* 1, no. 1 (2007): 67-81.; David Macey, "Rethinking Biopolitics, Race and Power in the Wake of Foucault," *Theory, Culture & Society* 26, no. 6 (2009): 186-205.; Andrew W. Neal, "Cutting Off the King's Head: Foucault's *Society must be Defended* and the Problem of Sovereignty," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 29, no. 4 (2004): 373-398; Julian Reid, "Life Struggles: War, Discipline, and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault," *Social Text* 24, no. 1 (2006): 127-152.

<sup>2</sup> Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge* (Marmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), 241.

<sup>3</sup> Michel Foucault, *Society must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France 1975-1976* (New York: Picador, 2003), 258.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 256.

<sup>5</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 156.

<sup>6</sup> Foucault, *Society must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France 1975-1976*, 256.

<sup>7</sup> To be clear, for Foucault, 'race' does not refer merely to the colour of skin, but more broadly a 'way of separating out the groups that exist within a population... to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower' Ibid., 254.

<sup>8</sup> Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's 'History of Sexuality' and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995), 9.

<sup>9</sup> Ellen K. Feder, *Family Bonds: Genealogies of Race and Gender* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007).; Ellen K. Feder, "The Dangerous Individual(s) Mother: Biopower, Family, and the Production of Race," *Hypatia* 22, no. 2 (2007): 60-78.

<sup>10</sup> Ladelle McWhorter, "Sex, Race, and Biopower: A Foucauldian Genealogy," *Hypatia* 19, no. 3 (2004): 38-62.; Ladelle McWhorter, *Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-America: A Genealogy* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009).



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- <sup>11</sup> Ibid., 14.
- <sup>12</sup> Feder, *Family Bonds: Genealogies of Race and Gender*, 3.
- <sup>13</sup> The analysis of gender rather than sexuality is genealogically problematic in Feder's book. Feder conducts a Butlerian genealogy of gender ontology rather than further work on sexuality as carried out by Foucault. As I argue elsewhere, gender is not the same technology of power as sexuality: A scrutiny of the historical construction of masculinities and femininities is not the same as a critique of the discourse of sexuality. See Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 43 and Jemima Repo, *Herculine Barbin and the Omission of Biopolitics from Judith Butler's Gender Genealogy* *Feminist Theory* (forthcoming 2014).
- <sup>14</sup> Feder, *Family Bonds: Genealogies of Race and Gender*, 87.
- <sup>15</sup> McWhorter, *Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-America: A Genealogy*, 15.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid, 34.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid, 35.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid, 12.
- <sup>19</sup> McWhorter makes a highly significant argument in relation to feminist theory, however, in provoking us to examine the relationship between race and sexuality beyond the idea of intersectionality that has dominated feminist theory for at least two decades. This is important for Foucauldian feminists in particular, since intersectionality is preoccupied with identities, rather than discourses and discipline. Ibid., 15.
- <sup>20</sup> Alison Mackinnon, "Redesigning the Population: Narratives of Sex and Race," in *Gender and Institutions: Welfare, Work and Citizenship*, eds. Moira Gatens and Alison Mackinnon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 149-166.; Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (London: Routledge, 1995).; Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978).
- <sup>21</sup> Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's 'History of Sexuality' and the Colonial Order of Things*, 25.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid, 25.
- <sup>23</sup> Foucault, *Society must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France 1975-1976*, 254.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid, 70-3.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid, 80.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid, 61.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid, 60.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid, 256.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid, 258.
- <sup>30</sup> Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's 'History of Sexuality' and the Colonial Order of Things*, 25.
- <sup>31</sup> Foucault, *Society must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France 1975-1976*, 252.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid, 251.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid, 254.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>35</sup> To be clear, Foucault is *not* claiming that sexuality is corporeal and race is not. On the contrary, biopolitics and the categories it produces are fundamentally premised upon the capture of the material, organic body. Foucault's point is that sexuality is defined through the recognition, observation and classification of specific bodily acts (i.e. sexual behaviour and conduct) in a way that race is not.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid, 252.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid, 251.
- <sup>38</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 25.
- <sup>39</sup> Foucault, *Society must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France 1975-1976*, 254.
- <sup>40</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 26.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid, 138.
- <sup>42</sup> Robert Bernasconi, "The Policing of Race Mixing: The Place of Biopower within the History of Racisms," *Bioethical Inquiry* 7 (2010): 209.
- <sup>43</sup> Michel Foucault, *Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-1975* (New York: Picador, 2003), 47.
- <sup>44</sup> Foucault, *Society must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France 1975-1976*, 250.
- <sup>45</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 139.
- <sup>46</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 149.
- <sup>47</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 102.
- <sup>48</sup> Foucault, *Society must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France 1975-1976*, 44.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid, 45.
- <sup>50</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 36-7.

- <sup>51</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège De France 1978-1979* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 14.
- <sup>52</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 141.
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid, 146.
- <sup>54</sup> Michel Foucault, *Dits Et Écrits II, 1976-1988* (Paris: Quatro Gallimard, 2001), 1013.
- <sup>55</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 118.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid, 47.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid, 145-6.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid, 118.
- <sup>59</sup> The relationship between biopolitics and sexuality seems somewhat repetitive: biopolitics produces sexuality to enforce the normative practices of heterosexuality that reproduce another generation of population to sexualize and reproduce. Arguably, this circularity is what makes biopolitics so self-sufficient. It does not 'need' the state in order to operate, arguably because the operation in question is the biological and economic re/production of the state itself.
- <sup>60</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>61</sup> Anne Marie Smith, *New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
- <sup>62</sup> See also McWhorter, *Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-America: A Genealogy*, 160-2.; Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 58-61.; Paul Apostolidis, "Sex Scandals, Racial Domination and the Systematic Correlation of Power-Modalities in Foucault," *Journal of Political Power* 4, no. 2 (2011): 185.
- <sup>63</sup> Gunnar Broberg and Nils Roll-Hansen, *Eugenics and the Welfare State: Sterilization Policy in Denmark, Sweden, Denmark and Finland* (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2005). Stoler's studies of colonial relations also shows how white colonial populations brought the biopolitics of life and death to bear on themselves. In Deli, for example, infirm, aged, insane and impoverished European subjects were either institutionalized in orphanages, workhouses and mental asylums, or sent home to maintain the image of a strong and healthy race. Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule*, 35.
- <sup>64</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 4.
- <sup>65</sup> Apostolidis, *Sex Scandals, Racial Domination and the Systematic Correlation of Power-Modalities in Foucault*.
- <sup>66</sup> Elin Peterson, "The Invisible Carers: Framing Domestic Work(ers) in Gender Equality Policies in Spain," *European Journal of Women's Studies* 14, no. 3 (2007): 265-280.
- <sup>67</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (London: Continuum, 2004), 434, 442.
- <sup>68</sup> Judith Butler, *Undoing Gender* (London: Routledge, 2004), 6.; Beth Loffreda, *Losing Matt Shepard: Life and Politics in the Aftermath of Anti-Gay Murder* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).; McWhorter, *Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-America: A Genealogy*, 1-11.; Mary E. Swigonski, Robin S. Mama and Kelly Ward, eds., *From Hate Crimes to Human Rights: A Tribute to Matthew Shepard* (New York: Routledge, 2001).
- <sup>69</sup> Elizabeth Grosz, *Space, Time, and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies* (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), 225.
- <sup>70</sup> Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*; Esposito, *Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy*.
- <sup>71</sup> Foucault, *Society must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France 1975-1976*, 260.
- <sup>72</sup> Judith Butler, "Sexual Inversions," in *Feminist Interpretations of Michel Foucault*, ed. Susan J. Hekman (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1996), 61.
- <sup>73</sup> Ibid, 72.
- <sup>74</sup> Ibid, 73.
- <sup>75</sup> Foucault, *Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-1975*, 60-1.
- <sup>76</sup> Susan Sontag, *Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and its Metaphors* (New York: Anchor Books, 1990), 151.
- <sup>77</sup> Not everyone diagnosed with HIV/AIDS was seen as 'guilty' of spreading the disease, however. Hemophiliacs and blood-transfusion recipients may have been seen as dangerous, but not to blame for their condition. However, like homosexuals, drug addicts and sex workers were seen as having only themselves to blame for engaging in deviant practices. Ibid., 114-5.
- <sup>78</sup> Stefan Elbe, "AIDS, Security, Biopolitics," *International Relations* 19, no. 4 (2005): 411.
- <sup>79</sup> Ibid, 411.
- <sup>80</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 105.
- <sup>81</sup> Jonathan Ned Katz, *The Invention of Heterosexuality* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 14.

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- <sup>82</sup> Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Epistemology of the Closet* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 44-5.; David M. Halperin, *Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
- <sup>83</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 105.
- <sup>84</sup> *Ibid*, 3.
- <sup>85</sup> Penelope Deutscher's recent article provides an excellent reading of procreative sex and the Malthusian couple in *Will to Knowledge*. Penelope Deutscher, "Foucault's 'History of Sexuality, Volume I': Re-Reading its Reproduction," *Theory, Culture & Society* 29, no. 1 (2012): 119-137.
- <sup>86</sup> Katz, *The Invention of Heterosexuality*, 19.
- <sup>87</sup> *Ibid*, 20.
- <sup>88</sup> *Ibid*, 92.
- <sup>89</sup> *Ibid*, 52-3.
- <sup>90</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 120.
- <sup>91</sup> Katz, *The Invention of Heterosexuality*, 51.
- <sup>92</sup> *Ibid*, 58.
- <sup>93</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 131.
- <sup>94</sup> Sigmund Freud, "Instincts and their Vicissitudes," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Vintage, 2001), 25.
- <sup>95</sup> Katz, *The Invention of Heterosexuality*, 60.
- <sup>96</sup> Freud, *Instincts and their Vicissitudes*, 124.
- <sup>97</sup> *Ibid*, 125.
- <sup>98</sup> Katz, *The Invention of Heterosexuality*, 60.
- <sup>99</sup> Guy Hocquenghem, *Homosexual Desire* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993), 73.
- <sup>100</sup> Katz, *The Invention of Heterosexuality*, 74.
- <sup>101</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 131.
- <sup>102</sup> Katz, *The Invention of Heterosexuality*, 187.
- <sup>103</sup> Smith, *New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality*, 18.
- <sup>104</sup> *Ibid*, 190.
- <sup>105</sup> Victoria Clarke, "'Stereotype, Attack and Stigmatize those Who Disagree': Employing Scientific Rhetoric in Debates about Lesbian and Gay Parenting," *Feminism & Psychology* 10, no. 1 (2000): 155.
- <sup>106</sup> Lynn D. Wardle, "The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children," *University of Illinois Law Review* 3 (1997): 846-7.
- <sup>107</sup> Stephen Hicks, "Is Gay Parenting Bad for Kids? Responding to the 'very Idea of Difference' in Research on Lesbian and Gay Parents," *Sexualities* 8, no. 2 (2005): 163.
- <sup>108</sup> Hocquenghem, *Homosexual Desire*, 106.
- <sup>109</sup> Judith Stacey, *In the Name of the Family: Rethinking Family Values in the Postmodern Age* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 129.
- <sup>110</sup> Hocquenghem calls the oedipalization of homosexuality the process by homosexuality has become defined through Oedipal development. For Freud, male homosexuality was a result of mother fixation and maintaining a homosexual object-choice, in other words, the enclosure of homosexuality to an identity of same-sex desire. Hocquenghem, *Homosexual Desire*, 79.
- <sup>111</sup> Victoria Clarke, "Sameness and Difference in Research on Lesbian Parenting," *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology* 12 (2002): 210-222.; Susan Golombok, Ann Spencer and Michael Rutter, "Children in Lesbian and Single-Parent Households: Psychosexual and Psychiatric Appraisal," *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry* 24, no. 4 (1983): 551-572.; Susan Golombok, Fiona Tasker and Clare Murray, "Children Raised in Fatherless Families from Infancy: Family Relationships and the Socioemotional Development of Children of Lesbian and Single Heterosexual Mothers," *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry* 38, no. 7 (1997): 783-791.; Richard Green and others, "Lesbian Mothers and their Children: A Comparison with Solo Parents Heterosexual Mothers and their Children," *Archives of Sexual Behaviour* 15, no. 2 (1986): 167-184.
- <sup>112</sup> William Meezan and Jonathan Rauch, "Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting and America's Children," *Marriage and Child Well-being* 15, no. 2 (2005): 103.
- <sup>113</sup> *Ibid*, 107.
- <sup>114</sup> *Ibid*, 108.
- <sup>115</sup> *Ibid*, 109.
- <sup>116</sup> Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge*, 159.